The framework Georgia uses to decide design defect claims was established in 1994. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994), set the risk-utility balancing test that all subsequent Georgia design defect cases apply. The test weighs the risks inherent in a product design against the utility derived from the product, with no single factor controlling.
Banks adopted risk-utility as the controlling Georgia framework #
Before Banks, Georgia courts had applied a variety of approaches to design defect claims, including the consumer expectations test from earlier cases such as Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868 (1975). The Supreme Court of Georgia, after surveying foreign jurisdictions and the Preliminary Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, replaced this with the risk-utility analysis. The Court held that the analysis in Parzini and Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201 (1985), would no longer be applied to design defect cases.
The shift was substantive. Under the consumer expectations test, the question was whether the product performed in a way the ordinary consumer would have expected. Under risk-utility, the question is whether the manufacturer should have adopted a reasonably safer design given the costs, benefits, and feasibility at the time of manufacture.
The factors weigh risk against utility, with feasibility of safer alternative design at the center #
The Banks opinion set out a non-exhaustive list of factors the jury weighs. The Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Volume 1, Civil Cases, 5th Edition, No. 62.650, incorporates these factors directly:
| Side | Factor |
|---|---|
| Risk-side | Severity of the danger posed by the design |
| Risk-side | Likelihood of that danger |
| Risk-side | Avoidability of the danger (user knowledge, publicity, warnings, common knowledge) |
| Risk-side | User's ability to avoid the danger |
| Utility-side | Usefulness of the product |
| Utility-side | Product's appearance and aesthetic attractiveness |
| Utility-side | Product's utility for multiple uses |
| Utility-side | Convenience and durability of the product |
| Manufacturer control | Technology available when the product was manufactured |
| Manufacturer control | Ability to eliminate the danger without impairing usefulness or making the product too expensive |
| Manufacturer control | Feasibility of spreading any increased cost through pricing or insurance |
| Manufacturer control | Alternative designs for the product |
No single factor is dispositive. The jury weighs them together and determines whether the manufacturer’s design choice was reasonable.
A reasonable alternative design is generally the central proof requirement #
While the Banks majority did not require alternative design proof as a strict element, Georgia practice and the concurrence in Banks itself emphasize the central importance of showing that a safer design was feasible at the time of manufacture. Plaintiffs typically establish this through expert engineering testimony demonstrating:
- The existence of an alternative design at the time of manufacture
- The technological feasibility of that alternative
- The marketability of the alternative (whether other manufacturers used it)
- The cost and economic feasibility of producing the alternative
Without proof of a reasonable alternative design, plaintiffs face significant difficulty in carrying the risk-utility burden, because the jury is being asked to find that the manufacturer’s design choice was unreasonable without seeing what the manufacturer should have done instead.
Compliance with industry standards is evidence, not a complete defense #
Compliance is not a shield. A manufacturer’s compliance with industry standards or government regulations is admissible evidence of reasonable design but does not bar a design defect claim, because the risk-utility analysis remains a comparative one that asks whether the manufacturer should have adopted a reasonably safer design given the costs, benefits, and feasibility at the time of manufacture. The Banks Court explicitly held that compliance with regulations does not eliminate liability.
Even a design that meets industry or regulatory standards may be unreasonable if a reasonably safer alternative existed. Manufacturers cannot defend a design defect claim solely by pointing to regulatory compliance. The question remains whether the design itself was reasonable given the risks and the available alternatives.
The test applies to both strict liability and negligent design claims #
Same framework. Georgia case law has applied the Banks risk-utility framework to both strict liability design defect claims under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) and to negligent design claims, with the underlying factors and balance remaining the same regardless of the legal theory under which the claim is brought. The proof a plaintiff develops on a design defect claim works for both theories pleaded in the same complaint.
Open and obvious dangers receive special treatment under Georgia law #
When a product’s danger is open and obvious to the ordinary user, Georgia courts have held that the user’s ability to perceive and avoid the danger affects the risk-utility analysis. In Smith v. Garden Way, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Ga. 1993), the court held that the open and obvious nature of an alleged design defect could bar liability under strict liability, negligence, and inadequate warning theories. Subsequent Georgia cases have refined this doctrine, treating obviousness as a factor in the risk-utility analysis rather than an absolute defense.
The doctrine matters most in cases involving simple tools or products with clearly visible mechanical hazards. It applies less forcefully to products with hidden risks or risks that emerge only during normal use.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Personal injury cases turn on specific facts and applicable law that vary by case. If you have been injured in Georgia and want to understand your legal options, consult a licensed Georgia personal injury attorney.