Defective Medical Device Cases in Georgia
Published 15 authorities named
The first question in a Georgia device case is how the FDA let that exact model on the market, because that decides what state law claims are left. If it had premarket approval, federal law blocks claims that add to FDA requirements, leaving those that parallel them. If it was cleared as substantially equivalent to another device, ordinary claims have far more room. After that, a device case also has to deal with what the surgeon knew.
Finding the pathway
Start with the implant record. Hospitals keep it in the operative note and sticker sheet: maker, model, lot, and serial number. A patient may also have an implant card. Federal rules call for a unique device identifier on a device’s label, with exceptions, under 21 C.F.R. § 801.20, so ask for that number too. Then check the FDA’s public premarket approval and 510(k) databases for that model.
| Path | What happened | Case | Effect on claims |
|---|---|---|---|
| Premarket approval (PMA) | FDA reviewed this device's safety and effectiveness | Riegel v. Medtronic | Only claims that parallel federal rules |
| 510(k) clearance | FDA found substantial equivalence to an earlier device | Medtronic v. Lohr | Claims in that case weren't blocked |
| Other paths | Such as de novo or a component listing | Neither case decided them | Have counsel check |
Don’t guess from the product category. Two similar implants might have taken different paths, and a supplement to an approval can matter too.
If it has premarket approval
Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008), held that § 360k applied to common law claims against an approved catheter. What’s left, it said, is a claim “premised on a violation of FDA regulations”, where state duties “parallel” federal ones. 21 U.S.C. § 360k bars any requirement “different from, or in addition to” a federal one.
| Claim | Likely treatment |
|---|---|
| "The approved design should have been different" | Preempted |
| "The FDA-approved label should have said more" | Preempted |
| "This unit wasn't made to the approved specification" | Potentially parallel |
| "The company lied to the FDA" | Preempted under Buckman |
| "The company broke a specific federal rule that also breached a state duty" | Potentially parallel, if pleaded in detail |
A parallel claim needs a specific federal requirement and a specific breach. Much of that information sits with the company, so the first complaint can be difficult to write. Federal preemption has the case law.
If it was cleared by 510(k)
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), said this review “is by no means comparable to the PMA process”. So Georgia’s regular theories come into play.
- Design. Risk-utility under Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732 (1994).
- Manufacturing. This unit departed from its intended design.
- Warning. Directed at the doctor, as below.
Those theories still need proof. In Sheffield v. Conair, 348 Ga. App. 6 (2018), about a heating pad, the claim failed for lack of evidence on the Banks factors and causation. Expect a device case to need an engineer and a doctor.
The surgeon as intermediary
In McCombs v. Synthes, 277 Ga. 252 (2003), a spinal plate broke after surgery. The court stated the rule for “a prescription drug or medical device”: the maker’s duty runs to the patient’s doctor. It also said that the warning must be “adequate or reasonable under the circumstances of the case”, and it sent the case back because that hadn’t been considered. The learned intermediary doctrine explains how causation works, including what the surgeon would have done. A surgeon who says the warning made no difference can end the claim.
Separating product claims from malpractice
| Question | Product claim | Malpractice claim |
|---|---|---|
| Who | Maker, maybe a seller | Surgeon, hospital |
| Key fact | The device or its warning | The choice or the technique |
| Filing requirement | Expert for causation | Expert affidavit under § 9-11-9.1 |
| Time limit | § 9-3-33 and the ten-year repose | § 9-3-71 and its repose |
Facts may support both. A failed implant could be bad design or poor placement, and each side will point at the other. A hospital that supplied the device may argue it’s a product seller. Malpractice deadlines need their own count.
Keeping the device
An explanted device is the main evidence, and hospitals may send it to the maker or discard it. Before any revision surgery, ask your lawyer and your surgeon about this.
- Tell the hospital in writing that the device must be kept, and that it shouldn’t go to the manufacturer without an agreed protocol.
- Document the chain. Who took it out, who received it, where it’s kept.
- No testing without notice. Destructive testing needs agreement from the parties.
- Keep records. Implant stickers, operative notes, imaging, pathology.
Under Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386 (2015), the duty to preserve can arise when litigation is reasonably foreseeable, and that includes the plaintiff’s side. Medical care comes first, always. Don’t delay a needed surgery for a legal reason.
Deadlines for a device claim
Two years. § 9-3-33. A device problem that develops slowly may raise the limited discovery rule for “bodily injury which develop only over an extended period of time”, under Corporation of Mercer University v. National Gypsum, 258 Ga. 365 (1988). Get advice on the date.
Ten years. Under Campbell v. Altec Industries, 288 Ga. 535 (2011), repose starts when a finished product “is sold as new to the intended consumer who is to receive the product”. Who that is for an implant, the hospital or the patient, wasn’t decided there. So date the first sale carefully, and consider the earlier date when counting.
Exceptions. § 51-1-11(c) lifts the limit for negligence claims based on products that “cause a disease or birth defect” or on willful, reckless, or wanton conduct. A mechanical failure isn’t a disease on its face. Love v. Whirlpool refused to stretch the word, in a house fire case.
Coordinated federal cases
Claims about one device pending in different districts may be sent to one federal court for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. If that happens, a Georgia case can move for that stage. Ask early whether a coordinated case exists, and how it affects your deadlines. Discovery there may reach complaint files and post-market reports, though other complaints have to meet the substantial similarity rule under Cooper Tire v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454 (2001), when offered at trial.
Punitive damages have no cap in a product case under § 51-12-5.1(e)(1), and 75 percent goes to the state under (e)(2).
Sources
- 21 C.F.R. § 801.20
- FDA premarket approval database
- FDA 510(k) database
- Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312
- 21 U.S.C. § 360k
- Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
- Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732
- Sheffield v. Conair, 348 Ga. App. 6
- McCombs v. Synthes, 277 Ga. 252
- Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386
- Corporation of Mercer University v. National Gypsum, 258 Ga. 365
- Campbell v. Altec Industries, 288 Ga. 535
- Love v. Whirlpool, 264 Ga. 701
- Cooper Tire v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454
- 28 U.S.C. § 1407
- Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 9-3-33, 9-3-71, 9-11-9.1, 51-1-11, 51-12-5.1
This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
More on: Defective product
- Filing a Product Liability Lawsuit in Georgia: Procedural Steps
- Industrial Equipment and Workplace Product Liability
- Product Liability Claims in Georgia: An Overview
- Failure to Warn Claims in Georgia Product Liability
- Comparative Negligence in Georgia Product Liability Cases
- Damages Available in Georgia Product Liability Cases
Authorities cited
Georgia code
- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71
- O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11
- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1
Court decisions
- Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312
- Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
- Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732
- Sheffield v. Conair, 348 Ga. App. 6
- McCombs v. Synthes, 277 Ga. 252
- Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386
- Corporation of Mercer University v. National Gypsum, 258 Ga. 365
- Campbell v. Altec Industries, 288 Ga. 535
- Love v. Whirlpool, 264 Ga. 701
- Cooper Tire v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454
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