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Comparative Negligence in Georgia Product Liability Cases

Published 16 authorities named

Georgia’s comparative fault statute applies to product liability cases, including strict liability. Johns v. Suzuki Motor of America, 310 Ga. 159 (2020), so held, on a jury’s finding that a rider was 49 percent at fault for not changing his brake fluid in eight years. Recovery is reduced by the plaintiff’s share and ends at 50 percent or more. Yet misuse and assumption of risk can have a larger effect, because they can defeat the claim altogether.

Four different defenses

They look alike, but they work differently.

Defense What it asks Effect Decision
Comparative fault Did the plaintiff's carelessness contribute? Reduces recovery, ending at 50 percent Johns
Assumption of risk Did the person actually know of and accept this danger? Can bar the claim Bodymasters; Dean
Unforeseeable misuse Was this use beyond what the maker had to anticipate? Product isn't defective Woods
Third-party alteration Did someone replace the design? No causation Talley

Fault of a non-party is a fifth point, below.

What Johns decided

The motorcycle’s brakes failed, and the jury found for the plaintiffs on all claims, with the rider at 49 percent. The trial court cut $10.5 million to $5,355,000. The Supreme Court held that § 51-12-33(a) reaches strict product liability claims.

The opinion also explains what the older case law allowed. A jury could consider a plaintiff’s conduct “if it went beyond merely failing to discover the product’s defect or to guard against the possibility of its existence and instead constituted a knowing assumption of the risk”. That earlier line doesn’t vanish, and it helps a plaintiff frame what fault means: a person who simply failed to spot a hidden defect isn’t an easy target. Whether a given act is fault under § 51-12-33 is still for the jury.

Assumption of risk needs actual knowledge

Decision Facts Result
Bodymasters v. Wimberley (1998) Gym user knew the leg press had no stop Jury question
Dean v. Toyota Industrial (2000) Worker hit by a forklift, said to know of the danger Jury question
Bodymasters (warning count) She knew wet shoes could slip and wiped them No proximate cause on warning

“A defect and the danger arising from it are not necessarily to be identified”, said Bodymasters v. Wimberley, 232 Ga. App. 170 (1998). Dean v. Toyota Industrial Equipment, 246 Ga. App. 255 (2000), says a person “must comprehend and appreciate the nature of the danger he confronts”. So knowing that a machine has no alarm isn’t the same as appreciating what could happen. These decisions predate Johns on how the theories overlap, so counsel should read them together.

Misuse: foreseeable or not

“[A] product manufacturer has no duty to design or warn against harm caused by an unforeseeable misuse of its product”, said Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, A18A0292 (2018). A firefighter’s pickup got a custom sliding bed that struck a gas strut on a truck cap’s door, and the door fell on his head. Nothing showed the cap’s maker could have foreseen that. The misuse was “the sole cause”.

Foreseeable misuse is another matter, since it’s “a factor” in the design balance. Wording matters here. The statute speaks of property not “reasonably suited to the use intended”, and it protects anyone who “may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by the property”. In Jones v. NordicTrack, 274 Ga. 115 (2001), a person walking through a room could sue, so use isn’t required.

Ask these questions.

Question Why
Did the maker's instructions cover this? Goes to foreseeability and warnings
Do others use it this way? Goes to foreseeability
Did the design invite it? Goes to the risk-utility balance
Did the maker know? Complaints, if they meet the similarity gate

Alterations after sale

In Talley v. City Tank, 158 Ga. App. 130 (1981), a city rebuilt a garbage truck’s lifting system, and a worker was killed. Injuries “cannot be traced to or be the proximate result of the manufacturer’s original design which did not exist at the time of injury”. A slight change may still be a jury question, as Talley notes. In Yamaha v. Hall, A26A0228 (2026), a modified golf cart’s modification defense was left for retrial. So a person who bought used needs the product’s history.

Obvious dangers

In a design case, obviousness is a factor, not a bar, under Ogletree v. Navistar, 269 Ga. 443 (1998). A rule from before Ogletree doesn’t control design cases now, so check the date of any decision cited to you. On a warning claim, the court left the question open, and Bodymasters shows that known danger can end that count on causation.

Other people’s fault

Section 51-12-33 can also reach non-parties. That’s where a product case gets complicated.

Who Basis Effect
Immune employer Walker v. Tensor Machinery Share counts, though the employer doesn't pay
Another driver Apportionment, with Polston on enhanced injury Share reduces the maker's
Repair shop Negligent maintenance As in Mack Trucks, a separate share
Parent of a child Ask counsel Gregory left parents' negligence for the jury in a premises case

Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297 (2015), says that immunity doesn’t stop a jury from assessing a percentage against an employer. Zaldivar sets the test for a non-party. The 50 percent rule explains the base statute.

What the defense will look for

  • Maintenance records, as with the brake fluid in Johns
  • Whether instructions were read and followed
  • Modifications and non-original parts
  • Prior incidents with the same product
  • Training, experience, and license
  • Alcohol or drugs
  • Whether a guard or safety feature was disabled

Answer these early, and accurately. A manual may show what the maker told users, and a failure to follow it can go either way: fault, or evidence that the warning was buried. In Wilson Foods v. Turner, 218 Ga. App. 74 (1995), a user who didn’t read a warning couldn’t challenge its content, but “[f]ailure to read a warning does not bar recovery when the plaintiff is challenging the adequacy of the efforts” to communicate the danger.

Time limits are separate from all this. Two years under § 9-3-33, and the ten-year repose in § 51-1-11(b)(2).

Sources

This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

More on: Defective product

Authorities cited

Georgia code

  • O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
  • O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
  • O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11

Court decisions

  • Johns v. Suzuki Motor of America, 310 Ga. 159
  • Bodymasters v. Wimberley, 232 Ga. App. 170
  • Dean v. Toyota Industrial Equipment, 246 Ga. App. 255
  • Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, A18A0292
  • Jones v. NordicTrack, 274 Ga. 115
  • Talley v. City Tank, 158 Ga. App. 130
  • Yamaha v. Hall, A26A0228
  • Ogletree v. Navistar, 269 Ga. 443
  • Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297
  • Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC, 262 Ga. 616
  • Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539
  • Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151
  • Wilson Foods v. Turner, 218 Ga. App. 74

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