Georgia’s premises liability statute: O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 explained

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 makes an owner or occupier who invites people onto land liable for injuries caused by a failure to use ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe. It’s one sentence, and its history line runs back to the Civil Code of 1895. Almost everything else lawyers argue about, including inspection, constructive knowledge, and the plaintiff’s own care, comes from decisions reading that sentence.

The sentence, phrase by phrase

“Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.”

Phrase	What it has meant	Source
"owner or occupier"	Who holds the space matters, not only who holds title	Flagler; Cham
"express or implied invitation"	The owner gets some benefit, real or supposed, or has an interest in the visit	Anderson v. Cooper, in Cham
"any lawful purpose"	A commercial sale isn't required	Esposito, in Cham
"ordinary care"	Diligence, not a guarantee	Dumas; Speaks
"premises and approaches"	Two different areas, and the duty varies with the owner's rights	Todd

The statute “does not purport to govern every instance of one going upon the land of another”, said Todd v. F. W. Woolworth, 258 Ga. 194 (1988). A licensee falls under § 51-3-2, and a trespasser under § 51-3-3, as classification explains.

“Premises and approaches” aren’t the same

Todd reasoned that the two words must mean different things, or the language would be redundant. The duty on an approach is “circumscribed by his right in the approach”, which gives a sliding scale.

Owner's right in the approach	Duty
Owns it	Widest latitude, and due care within it
Easement	Due care within what the easement allows
Public way	Limited, but it still exists, such as removing an obstacle or warning

Woolworth didn’t own the icy plaza outside its door, but the question of its negligence still went to a jury. What the statute doesn’t reach has been tested too. A bus stop outside an amusement park wasn’t an approach in Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, 301 Ga. 323 (2017). Sidewalk falls carry this further.

“Ordinary care” and the insurer line

An owner isn’t an insurer. “The mere ownership of land or buildings does not render one liable for injuries sustained by persons who have entered thereon or therein”, said Speaks v. Rouse Co. of Georgia, 172 Ga. App. 9 (1984), which added that “[t]he true ground of liability is the owner’s superior knowledge of the perilous condition”. That phrase, superior knowledge, is the core of the case law.

The two-part test added by decisions

Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735 (1997), reaffirmed that a slip-and-fall plaintiff must prove “(1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier.”

Three parts of Robinson deserve a second read.

• The order of proof. The plaintiff’s burden on the second part “is not shouldered until the defendant establishes negligence on the part of the plaintiff”.
• Not looking. Failing to look where you step doesn’t establish a lack of care as a matter of law. An invitee “is entitled to assume that the owner/occupier has exercised reasonable care”.
• Summary judgment. A court may decide negligence as a matter of law “only where the evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable”.

Robinson didn’t remove the limits. In SMG Construction Services v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819 (2025), the Supreme Court held that “[a] plaintiff’s misapprehension of the precise details of a known hazard does not negate his actual knowledge of that hazard.” A footnote in that opinion noted the Robinson elements may not decide every case. So the test matters, but it isn’t the statute.

Actual and constructive knowledge has its own page, and the first part’s inspection side is on inspection routines.

Where § 51-3-1 stops

Situation	What governs instead
Space fully leased to a tenant	§ 44-7-14, a "mutually exclusive" source under Cham
A guest with permission only	§ 51-3-2
No permission	§ 51-3-3
Crime by a third person	§§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57, added by SB 68 in 2025
Worker hurt on the employer's site	Workers' compensation exclusivity may apply
City or county land	Immunity and notice rules come first

The crime point is new. Under § 51-3-53, the negligent security article is the “sole and exclusive remedy” against owners or occupiers, with exceptions. A claim that once ran under § 51-3-1 now has its own elements for causes of action arising on or after the Act’s effective date in 2025. Earlier ones stay under prior law.

Fault still gets divided

A plaintiff who clears the two-part test can still have damages reduced. Section 51-12-33 divides fault, and recovery ends when the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible. Section 51-11-7 adds a defense when a plaintiff could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence by ordinary care. The two-year time limit is in § 9-3-33.

A short way to test a claim

1. Was the person invited, under the benefit test?
2. Does this defendant own, occupy, or have rights in this spot?
3. What exactly was the hazard, and is there proof it caused the fall?
4. What did the defendant know, or should it have known?
5. What did the plaintiff know, and what would a careful person have done?

If you can’t answer question 3, the rest won’t matter, as All American Quality Foods v. Britten, A24A1262 (2025), shows.

Sources

• Todd v. F. W. Woolworth, 258 Ga. 194
• Cham v. ECI Management, 311 Ga. 170
• Dumas v. Tripps of North Carolina, 229 Ga. App. 814
• Speaks v. Rouse Co. of Georgia, 172 Ga. App. 9
• Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, 301 Ga. 323
• Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735
• SMG Construction Services v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819
• All American Quality Foods v. Britten, A24A1262
• Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 9-3-33, 44-7-14, 51-3-1, 51-3-2, 51-3-3, 51-11-7, 51-12-33
• Georgia Senate Bill 68 (2025): §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57

This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.