Exceptions to Georgia’s statute of limitations (tolling, minors, fraud, and more)
Published 19 authorities named
Georgia pauses the limitation period in a short list of situations, set out mainly in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90 to 9-3-99. Each one has conditions, and the plaintiff must show the facts that bring it into play. Treat them as a backup. The safe date remains two years under § 9-3-33 for a car accident injury. A pause that protects one person can also leave another family member or claim outside it, so check each claimant separately.
The list
| Rule | Who it covers | What happens | Limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| § 9-3-90(a) | Legally incompetent when the claim accrues | Same time after the disability is removed | Requires that status |
| § 9-3-90(b) | Under 18 when the claim accrues | Same time after turning 18 | Medical claims differ |
| § 9-3-91 | Disability arising after accrual | Time stops during the disability | Not if voluntarily caused |
| § 9-3-92 | A person's estate | Time between death and representation is not counted | No more than five years |
| § 9-3-93 | Creditors of an estate | Same | No more than five years |
| § 9-3-94 | Claim against a defendant who left | Absence "shall not be counted" | "Unless otherwise provided by law" |
| § 9-3-95 | Joint right of action | Runs after all disabilities end | Not if severable |
| § 9-3-96 | Fraud that debars or deters suit | Runs from discovery of the fraud | Fraud required |
| § 9-3-99 | Victim of an alleged crime | Pauses until prosecution ends | No more than six years |
Minors and incompetence
A person injured at 14 has until 20 to sue on an ordinary injury claim. So does a person injured at age 6. The clock begins at 18 and runs two years. Medical malpractice is different, because § 9-3-71 and § 9-3-73 have their own rules for children. See limitation and repose. A child’s parents may have their own separate claims, such as for medical expenses, and those are not paused by the child’s age. Do not assume the child’s date applies to them.
Section 9-3-90(a) applies to a person “legally incompetent because of intellectual disability or mental illness”. That is a demanding standard. Being in pain, medicated, or upset does not by itself meet it. A claim that relies on this needs medical and factual proof for the specific period. A coma or brain injury may raise it, and the timing of the person’s recovery can be disputed.
A defendant who leaves Georgia
Section 9-3-94 says, “if a defendant removes from this state, the time of his absence from the state until he returns to reside shall not be counted or estimated in his favor”. The words “Unless otherwise provided by law” matter, because Georgia’s long-arm statute, § 9-10-91, and the rules allowing service on nonresident motorists can permit suit despite the absence. A plaintiff should plan to serve the out-of-state driver within the period and treat this as a fallback. Counsel can check how Georgia courts have read the section with those other statutes.
Fraud
Section 9-3-96 says, “If the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the fraud.” Refusing to admit fault is not fraud in this sense. For example, imagine a driver who gives a false name and insurance details at the scene, and the plaintiff cannot identify the driver. That is closer to the point, but the proof and the plaintiff’s diligence still matter.
An alleged crime
Section 9-3-99 says the limitation period for “any cause of action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime” is tolled “until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years”.
Three decisions mark its reach.
| Decision | Facts | Holding |
|---|---|---|
| Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733 (2009) | Traffic citation for following too closely | A Uniform Rules of the Road violation is a crime for this purpose, and no separate finding of intent is needed |
| Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393 (2016) | Civil defendant was not the accused | It applies "regardless of whether the defendant in the case has been accused" |
| Hicks v. Universal Health Services (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) | Parents of crime victims suing for deaths | It did not apply to survivor claims, because the parents were not the victims of the crimes |
So an injured driver hit by a cited driver has a real argument. A family suing for wrongful death should not assume the same result, as the wrongful death deadline explains. The dates that matter are the date of the alleged crime and the date the case ended, so get the citation’s disposition from the court. A quick guilty plea or bond forfeiture can end the prosecution soon after the crash, leaving little added time.
Estates
Section 9-3-92 says the time between a death and the start of representation “shall not be counted against his estate”, for no more than five years. That protects the estate’s claims. It does not reach a surviving family member’s own wrongful death claim. Section 9-3-93 protects creditors in a similar way when the defendant has died. In that situation, an estate needs a representative to be sued, so a plaintiff may have to arrange that. See the difference between wrongful death and survival actions.
Government defendants
These are separate from the rules above and come sooner.
| Defendant | Deadline | Pause |
|---|---|---|
| City, § 36-33-5 | Present written claim within six months of the event | Limitation suspended while the demand is pending with no action |
| County, § 36-11-1 | Present within 12 months of accrual | Disabled persons have 12 months after removal |
| State, § 50-21-26 | Notice within 12 months of when the loss was or should have been discovered | The notice is a requirement for suit |
A paused suit deadline does not automatically pause a notice deadline. Read each statute’s own words on disability.
What is not an exception
- Negotiating with an insurer.
- Being a minor’s parent, if your own claim is the one at issue.
- Being unaware of the law.
- Filing on time and then serving late. Service of process covers how a late service can cost the claim.
- A later diagnosis, in the ordinary case. Georgia’s discovery rule is narrow.
- Filing in the wrong court, without checking § 9-2-61.
Section 9-2-61 is not tolling. It allows renewal of a suit that was timely filed and then dismissed, within six months, on the terms covered on missing the statute of limitations. Section 9-3-97 is a narrow rule for counterclaims and cross-claims.
How to use this list
Calendar the normal date first. Then, for each person with a claim, ask whether any rule above applies. Only if the normal date has passed does the question become whether one applies strongly enough to rest the claim on, and at that point, the facts need to be proved.
Sources
- Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 9-2-61, 9-3-33, 9-3-71, 9-3-73, 9-3-90 to 9-3-97, 9-3-99, 9-10-91, 36-11-1, 36-33-5, 50-21-26
- Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733
- Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393
- Hicks v. Universal Health Services, A22A0204
This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
Authorities cited
Georgia code
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-91
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-92
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-93
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-95
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73
- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91
- O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5
- O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1
- O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26
- O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61
Court decisions
- Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733
- Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393
- Hicks v. Universal Health Services, A22A0204
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