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Exceptions to the 10-Year Repose (Long-Latency Disease, Willful Conduct, Continuing Duty)

Published 14 authorities named

Three routes get a Georgia product claim past the ten-year repose, all through § 51-1-11(c), and none helps a strict liability count: negligence in making products that “cause a disease or birth defect”, conduct that “manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property”, and the duty to warn “once that danger becomes known”. The phrase “long-latency” isn’t in the statute, so the test is disease, not delay. The decisions are stricter about proof than the labels suggest.

The text

Subsection (c) has two sentences, and they do different things. The first applies ten years to negligence, “except an action seeking to recover from a manufacturer for injuries or damages arising out of the negligence of such manufacturer in manufacturing products which cause a disease or birth defect, or arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property”. The second says “[n]othing contained in this subsection shall relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn”.

Route What it reaches Strict liability? Key decision
Disease or birth defect Negligence in manufacturing No Love v. Whirlpool
Willful, reckless, or wanton Negligence claims with that conduct No Ford v. Cosper
Duty to warn Failure-to-warn negligence No Chrysler v. Batten

Strict liability’s own limit is in (b)(2), and it has no such language. As Chrysler v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723 (1994), and PTI Royston v. Eubanks, 360 Ga. App. 263 (2021), show, a case can continue on the negligence counts after strict liability falls. In PTI Royston, a talc supplier sought the repose only on the strict liability counts, and the court said nothing in (b) “imposes a statute of repose on their claims for negligence”.

Disease or birth defect

The word has limits. In Love v. Whirlpool, 264 Ga. 701 (1994), a family argued that fire injuries and smoke deaths were a disease. That “would be to expand the term ‘disease’ virtually to the point of meaninglessness”. The court saw these exceptions as aimed at harms with a delayed effect.

Asbestos and similar exposures are the obvious fit, though the claim still needs negligence. In PTI Royston, a woman who used talc from 1963 to 2016 developed ovarian cancer, and her strict liability counts were barred even under Georgia’s asbestos statute. Causation is its own hurdle in such a case. John Crane v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747 (2004), said multiple defendants’ conduct needn’t each be “substantial”, and Scapa Dryer Fabrics v. Knight, 299 Ga. 286 (2016), later said exposure must make “a meaningful contribution”, since “a de minimis contribution to an injury is not sufficient”.

The text mentions negligence “in manufacturing products”. Whether it reaches design or warnings on those products is something to raise with counsel.

Reckless conduct stands alone

Ford v. Cosper, 317 Ga. 356 (2023), answered questions from a federal court about an Explorer’s roof. “[R]eckless disregard for life or property is a standalone exception.” It defined the term: the actor “intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize” that the conduct “not only creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another’s life or property but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result”.

The Court also disapproved the Court of Appeals’ earlier definition in Walden to the extent it conflicts. So don’t use that formulation. Cosper didn’t decide whether the evidence was enough.

Decision Evidence Result
Chrysler v. Batten (1994) Federal documents on an earlier, different belt mechanism Insufficient as a matter of law
Parks v. Hyundai (2008) Other complaints without a showing of similarity No evidence for the exception
Chrysler v. Walden (2018) Long knowledge of a tank location, a recall request, a CEO's meeting with regulators Jury found reckless or wanton
Burroughs (2025) Not reached at the pleading stage Other counts went on

The Batten point is exact: documents about a 1975 mechanism couldn’t show recklessness in making a 1978 car. So tie the evidence to this model and this date. Parks v. Hyundai, 294 Ga. App. 112 (2008), adds the Cooper Tire similarity rule. In Chrysler v. Walden, 303 Ga. 358 (2018), the Supreme Court addressed compensation evidence, on plain-error review, so it isn’t a ruling that such facts always suffice.

The duty to warn

Batten: “With this language the legislature carefully excluded failure-to-warn causes of action from the statute of repose.” Note these limits.

  • Knowledge. The statute says “once that danger becomes known”. Batten’s majority also used “knows or reasonably should know”. A separate opinion urged actual knowledge. Plead facts that meet both.
  • Evidence. Batten said it had “no opinion” on whether the warning evidence was enough.
  • What it requires. The statute speaks of warning. A claim that a maker should have recalled a product isn’t spelled out in that sentence, though in Mack Trucks a jury found “negligent failure to recall or warn”.
  • Feasibility. Who could have been reached, and how, may be disputed in a very old product.
  • Causation. Would a warning have changed what happened?

What the exceptions don’t do

They don’t suspend the two-year limit. A person hurt in year fifteen still has § 9-3-33 to meet, and Love shows that renewal after a dismissal may not help. They don’t override federal preemption either. And they apply only against a manufacturer, by the text.

The first-sale date should be fixed first, because a claim inside ten years doesn’t need any exception. For repeat purchases, Burroughs v. Strength of Nature Global, 322 Ga. 722 (2025), lets later units stand on their own.

Planning an older-product case

Step Question
1 Which counts fall? Strict liability and ordinary negligence on design or manufacture
2 Is the harm a disease or birth defect, or a sudden trauma?
3 What specific document or event shows knowledge of this model's risk?
4 Do incident reports meet the similarity test?
5 When did the maker learn of the danger, and who could it have warned?
6 What does the injury date do to the two-year limit?

Reckless conduct and punitive damages overlap but aren’t the same test. Section 51-12-5.1(b) has its own standard, on punitive damages.

Sources

This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Authorities cited

Georgia code

  • O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11
  • O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
  • O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1

Court decisions

  • Chrysler v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723
  • PTI Royston v. Eubanks, 360 Ga. App. 263
  • Love v. Whirlpool, 264 Ga. 701
  • John Crane v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747
  • Scapa Dryer Fabrics v. Knight, 299 Ga. 286
  • Ford v. Cosper, 317 Ga. 356
  • Parks v. Hyundai, 294 Ga. App. 112
  • Cooper Tire v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454
  • Chrysler v. Walden, 303 Ga. 358
  • Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539
  • Burroughs v. Strength of Nature Global, 322 Ga. 722

Every source, with its link

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