Pre-Suit Settlement Demands Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1: The 2024 Senate Bill 83 Framework

A Georgia plaintiff’s attorney prepares a time-limited policy-limits settlement demand 11 months after a serious rear-end collision left her client with multiple surgeries, ongoing pain management, and documented damages exceeding $400,000. The at-fault driver carries $100,000 in liability coverage. The demand letter goes out by certified mail, sets a 30-day acceptance deadline, includes all the required medical records, identifies the parties to be released, specifies the type of release, and requires the insurer to provide a sworn statement confirming that all liability and casualty insurance applicable to the claim has been disclosed. The insurer has 30 days to accept on the statute’s terms or face the prospect of an excess verdict and a Holt failure-to-settle claim. This is the practical operation of Georgia’s pre-suit demand statute under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1, as substantially restructured by Senate Bill 83 in April 2024. This article walks through what § 9-11-67.1 is, how the 2024 SB 83 amendment changed the framework, the seven exclusive material terms, the bilateral contract structure, the sworn statement requirement, the insurer safe harbor, the relationship to Holt failure-to-settle claims, and the practical implications for Georgia plaintiffs.

What § 9-11-67.1 is and what it does #

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 is Georgia’s statutory framework for pre-suit time-limited settlement demands in motor vehicle accident cases. The statute provides structured procedures for plaintiffs’ counsel to make policy-limits demands to liability insurers, with defined material terms, acceptance mechanics, and consequences for the insurer’s response.

The statute traces back to a 2013 enactment that codified principles from the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992), which established the common-law framework for failure-to-settle bad-faith claims against insurers. The statute has been amended multiple times since 2013, with significant revisions in 2021 under House Bill 714 and the most substantial overhaul in 2024 under Senate Bill 83.

The current framework applies to settlement offers in motor vehicle accident cases for personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death. It does not apply to product liability claims, and it operates differently from the general civil practice rules that govern other settlement offers.

The statute’s practical effect is that a properly drafted § 9-11-67.1 demand creates a structured pathway for the plaintiff to make a record that supports a potential Holt failure-to-settle claim if the insurer rejects or fails to accept the demand and the case later produces an excess verdict against the insured.

The 2024 Senate Bill 83 overhaul #

Senate Bill 83, signed by Governor Kemp on April 22, 2024, substantially restructured § 9-11-67.1. The amendments responded to a series of appellate decisions where time-limited demands accepted by insurers had been judicially invalidated based on technical non-compliance with conditions in the demands. Cases like Patrick v. Kingston, 370 Ga. App. 570 (2024) and Pierce v. Banks, 368 Ga. App. 496 (2023) had voided settlements where the insurer accepted the demand but the acceptance was found to include language that constituted a counter-offer rather than acceptance.

The SB 83 amendments apply to all offers made on or after April 22, 2024. The key structural changes include:

Bilateral contract structure. Under SB 83, every § 9-11-67.1 demand is treated as an offer to enter into a bilateral contract rather than a unilateral contract. The change matters because under unilateral contract analysis, the insurer’s failure to perform any specific act required by the demand could be construed as rejection or counter-offer rather than acceptance. Under bilateral contract analysis, the insurer’s written acceptance creates a binding contract, and any subsequent failure to perform specific terms becomes a breach-of-contract issue rather than a rejection issue.

Enumerated exclusive material terms. The amended statute enumerates seven specific terms as the only material terms that can be required in a § 9-11-67.1 demand. Any additional terms included in the demand are deemed immaterial, and the insurer’s failure to comply with them does not constitute rejection of the demand for purposes of failure-to-settle exposure.

Insurer safe harbor. The amended statute creates a safe harbor from failure-to-settle litigation when the insurer accepts the demand in accordance with the statute’s material terms. An insurer that follows the safe harbor cannot be subjected to a civil action arising from an alleged failure to settle, even if the insurer’s acceptance includes minor deviations from non-material terms in the demand.

Pre-answer rather than pre-suit timing. Demands can be made any time before all named defendants have filed initial answers or been found in default, rather than only before suit is filed. This expands the window during which the statute operates.

Motor vehicle collision scope. The amended statute applies to personal injury, bodily injury, and wrongful death claims arising from a “motor vehicle collision” rather than the broader “use of a motor vehicle” scope under the prior framework.

The seven exclusive material terms #

The amended § 9-11-67.1 enumerates the only material terms that can be required in a settlement demand. The list, drawn from § 9-11-67.1(b)(1) as amended:

1. A specific date by which the offer must be accepted. This deadline must be not less than 30 days from the date of receipt of the offer.
2. A specific date by which payment must be delivered. This deadline must be not less than 40 days from the date of receipt of the offer.
3. The amount to be paid. The specific dollar amount of the settlement offer.
4. Identification of the parties to be released. Who is being released from liability as part of the settlement.
5. The type of release offered. Whether the release is full or limited, and the scope of the release.
6. The claims to be released. The specific claims that the release will cover.
7. A requirement that the recipient provide a sworn statement. Specifically, a statement under oath regarding whether all liability and casualty insurance issued by the recipient that provides or may provide coverage for the claim has been disclosed, with a delivery date for the sworn statement of not less than 40 days from receipt of the offer. This requirement may be waived by the offeror.

The exclusivity of this list is the central protection for insurers. A demand that includes additional terms (a requirement that payment be made in a specific currency, that the check be made out to a specific entity, that the release include language drafted by the plaintiff’s attorney) does not invalidate the demand under the statute, but those additional terms are immaterial and the insurer’s failure to comply with them does not constitute rejection.

The transmission method for the demand remains certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, consistent with the prior statutory framework.

The sworn statement requirement #

The sworn statement requirement merits separate attention because it is one of the more recent additions to the § 9-11-67.1 framework. Under the current statute, a settlement demand may require the recipient insurer to provide a sworn statement, typically by an officer or claims representative with personal knowledge, addressing whether all liability and casualty insurance coverage applicable to the claim has been disclosed.

The requirement addresses a recurring concern in pre-suit demand practice: plaintiffs accepting policy-limits settlements often discover later that additional coverage was available (an umbrella policy, additional named insureds, separate household policies). The sworn statement creates a record that the insurer has disclosed all applicable coverage, with the sworn statement supporting later claims if undisclosed coverage is discovered.

Notably, the requirement applies only to the insurer’s disclosure of coverage it provides for the claim. The amended statute does not impose a sworn statement requirement on the insured driver personally. Plaintiffs’ counsel historically requested affidavits of no additional insurance from individual defendants, and the SB 83 framework does not extend the statutory requirement to that scenario.

The insurer safe harbor #

The safe harbor under § 9-11-67.1(i)(1) is the centerpiece of the SB 83 protections. The statute provides that “there shall be no civil action arising from an alleged failure to settle” when the insurer accepts a time-limited demand in accordance with the terms of the statute.

The safe harbor operates as a complete defense to subsequent failure-to-settle claims, including Holt claims, when the insurer’s acceptance complies with the material terms of the demand. The insurer’s acceptance creates a binding bilateral contract on those material terms, and disputes about non-material terms become breach-of-contract issues to be resolved through enforcement actions rather than failure-to-settle litigation.

The safe harbor does not apply when the insurer fails to accept the demand within the time period, when the insurer’s purported acceptance does not address the material terms, or when the insurer’s response constitutes a counter-offer on a material term. In those scenarios, the prior framework (and the Holt failure-to-settle doctrine) continues to apply.

The safe harbor extends to acceptance of any offer to settle a tort claim arising from a motor vehicle collision, even where the offer expressly states that the statute does not apply. The statute thus reaches both demands made under § 9-11-67.1 and demands made outside the statute’s framework, with the insurer’s acceptance in accordance with the material terms providing the safe harbor.

How § 9-11-67.1 interacts with Holt failure-to-settle claims #

The statutory framework and the common-law Holt doctrine work together. A properly drafted § 9-11-67.1 demand makes a record that supports a future Holt claim if the insurer fails to accept the demand and the case later produces an excess verdict against the insured.

The relationship operates this way:

1. Plaintiff’s counsel sends a § 9-11-67.1 demand with the seven material terms, the 30-day acceptance window, and the 40-day payment window.
2. The insurer receives the demand and has the option to accept on the statutory terms (triggering the safe harbor) or to allow the deadline to pass.
3. If the insurer fails to accept, the demand expires and the plaintiff can proceed to suit.
4. The case proceeds to trial and (in cases of clear liability and serious damages) may produce a verdict exceeding the policy limits.
5. The insured at-fault driver faces excess liability and can pursue a Holt claim against the insurer, typically assigning the claim to the third-party plaintiff who obtains the right to collect from the insurer.
6. The insurer’s exposure in the Holt claim is the entire excess verdict, plus interest, costs, and potentially attorney fees.

The § 9-11-67.1 demand creates the documentary record of the policy-limits offer and the insurer’s failure to accept. Combined with evidence of clear liability and serious damages, the failure to accept supports the conclusion that a reasonable insurer would have accepted the offer, which is the central question in a Holt claim.

Practical procedural considerations #

Several procedural points shape the practical handling of § 9-11-67.1 demands:

Timing of the demand. Demands can be made any time before all named defendants have filed their answers. The strategic timing varies by case. Earlier demands give the insurer more time to investigate but also extend the period before the plaintiff can develop the failure-to-settle record. Later demands (just before the answer is filed) create time pressure for the insurer.

Documentation included with the demand. The amended statute requires the demand to include medical or other records in the claimant’s possession that are sufficient to allow the insurer to evaluate the claim. Inadequate documentation can support an argument that the insurer had no reasonable opportunity to evaluate the offer.

Counter-offers and conditional acceptances. Under the bilateral contract structure, an insurer’s written acceptance creates a binding contract on the material terms. The risk of “gotcha” counter-offers from acceptance language has been substantially reduced. Pre-SB 83 cases like Patrick v. Kingston and Pierce v. Banks, where settlement was voided based on minor acceptance language, are less likely to recur under the new framework.

Performance versus formation issues. Under the bilateral framework, the insurer’s failure to deliver payment within the 40-day window is typically a performance issue (breach of contract) rather than a formation issue (rejection of the offer). The plaintiff’s remedy in such cases is typically enforcement of the settlement rather than invalidation, though the specific facts matter.

Scope of coverage discovery. The sworn statement requirement creates a record that supports later recovery if undisclosed coverage is identified. Plaintiffs should include the sworn statement requirement in demands to preserve this remedy.

The insurer’s defense posture. A § 9-11-67.1 demand is not a one-sided exposure for the insurer. The defense framework includes several substantial arguments. The bona fide controversy doctrine provides a defense when liability or damages are genuinely contested on reasonable grounds; an insurer that declines to tender policy limits because liability allocation is in dispute, because comparative fault analysis points to plaintiff fault under § 51-12-33, or because damages are not adequately documented, can argue that its evaluation was reasonable under the “ordinarily prudent insurer” standard articulated in Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003). The defense argument is most powerful when the insurer can point to specific liability disputes, specific damages disputes, or specific coverage questions that justified the decision not to tender. The plaintiff’s counter-argument typically focuses on whether the insurer’s evaluation was unreasonable given the available evidence at the time of the demand, which is the standard Brightman itself applied to reject the insurer’s bona fide controversy claim on the facts of that case.

Practical implications for Georgia plaintiffs #

Several practical points shape § 9-11-67.1 strategy for Georgia plaintiffs:

• The seven material terms are the operative scope. Plaintiffs’ counsel preparing § 9-11-67.1 demands should focus on the seven material terms and avoid including additional terms that may complicate acceptance analysis.
• 30-day acceptance and 40-day payment are statutory floors. The demand can provide longer periods but cannot shorten the statutory minimums. Plaintiffs’ counsel typically uses the statutory floors to create pressure on the insurer.
• Documentation matters. Including comprehensive medical records, treatment summaries, and damages documentation with the demand strengthens both the demand itself and any subsequent failure-to-settle claim.
• The sworn statement requirement preserves later remedies. Demanding the sworn statement creates a record that supports later claims if additional coverage is discovered. Omitting the requirement removes that protection.
• Pre-answer timing creates strategic flexibility. The expansion from pre-suit to pre-answer timing allows plaintiffs to make demands after filing suit if the case develops in ways that support a policy-limits demand.
• The safe harbor protects insurers but does not eliminate failure-to-settle exposure. Insurers that fail to accept demands within the statutory framework remain exposed to Holt claims if the case proceeds to an excess verdict.
• The 2024 amendment applies prospectively. Demands made before April 22, 2024 are governed by the prior framework. The case law interpreting the prior statute (including Patrick and Pierce) continues to apply to pre-amendment demands.

Bottom line #

Georgia’s pre-suit demand statute under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1, as substantially restructured by Senate Bill 83 effective April 22, 2024, creates a structured framework for time-limited policy-limits settlement demands in motor vehicle accident cases. The seven exclusive material terms (acceptance deadline, payment deadline, amount, parties released, type of release, claims released, and sworn statement requirement) are the only material terms that can be required in a demand. The bilateral contract structure replaces the prior unilateral framework, with the insurer’s written acceptance creating a binding agreement on the material terms. The insurer safe harbor protects against failure-to-settle claims when the insurer accepts the demand in accordance with the statute, while the common-law Holt doctrine remains available when the insurer fails to accept and the case produces an excess verdict. For Georgia plaintiffs facing serious-injury claims against at-fault drivers with limited liability coverage, the § 9-11-67.1 demand is the primary procedural pathway to preserve potential excess-verdict recovery through failure-to-settle exposure. The companion pieces on insurance bad faith, UM/UIM coverage, and liability insurance cover the surrounding framework. This piece closes the Georgia car accident cluster.

Disclaimer #

This article provides general information about Georgia law and is not legal advice. Every case turns on specific facts, and the application of statutes, case law, and recent amendments depends on the circumstances. Anyone considering a claim should consult a licensed Georgia attorney about their particular situation.