Medical expenses recovery in Georgia car accident claims

A Georgia car accident plaintiff recovers medical expenses under one of two regimes, and the date the cause of action arose decides which. For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1.1 limits these damages to the reasonable value of medically necessary care and lets the jury hear what insurance would pay. An earlier cause of action stays under prior law and its collateral source rule.

The two regimes side by side

Question	Cause of action arose before April 21, 2025	Arose on or after April 21, 2025
Source	Prior law, including the collateral source rule	§ 51-12-1.1, Section 7 of SB 68
Measure	Prior law	"the reasonable value of medically necessary care, treatment, or services"
Who decides the amount	The jury	"the trier of fact", under (b)
Insurance write-offs	Kept out in Olariu v. Marrero	Part of the evidence if the plaintiff has health insurance
Letter of protection	Prior law	Listed items are "relevant and discoverable" under (d)

The date test comes from Section 9(b) of Senate Bill 68: Sections 6 and 7 “shall apply only with respect to causes of action arising on or after the effective date of this Act”, and prior causes of action “shall be governed by prior law”. The governor signed the Act on April 21, 2025. A crash on April 20 and a crash on April 21 therefore fall on opposite sides. A rule stated as “2025 or later” is wrong for the first 110 days of that year.

Under prior law

The collateral source rule kept evidence of outside payments away from the jury. In Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga. App. 824 (2001), a hospital had written off part of a bill. The Court of Appeals held the write-off was a collateral source, upheld the order excluding the evidence, and rejected the argument that the plaintiff should not recover the amount written off. The rule’s statutory rival was struck down earlier in Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41.

Prior law still matters. A claim from before the effective date can be in litigation for years, and a tolling rule can extend the filing date.

What § 51-12-1.1 changes

Subsection (c) has a condition. It applies “If the plaintiff in any such civil action has any form of public or private health insurance, including benefits under a governmental workers’ compensation program”. The evidence then includes both “the amounts charged” and “the amounts actually necessary to satisfy such charges” under the contract or program.

Not using insurance does not avoid it. The evidence comes in “regardless of whether the health insurance has been used, is used, or will be used to satisfy such charges”. A plaintiff who treats outside the plan may still face the plan’s numbers.

Workers’ compensation is narrower than it sounds. The words are “a governmental workers’ compensation program”. What comes in is the amount necessary to satisfy the charges under that program. The text does not say all workers’ compensation payments are admissible in every case.

Letters of protection are discoverable, with a list. Under (d), the following “shall be relevant and discoverable” in a claim for care given in exchange for a promise of payment from a judgment or settlement:

1. a copy of the letter of protection;
2. all charges, itemized and coded where applicable;
3. if the provider sold the account to a third party for less than the invoice price, the buyer’s name and the price paid; and
4. whether the claimant was referred for treatment under such an arrangement, and who made the referral.

Being relevant and discoverable is different from a rule that every item reaches the jury. Other evidence rules still apply.

The common law rule is cut back only so far. Subsection (e) abrogates the collateral source rule “to the extent necessary to introduce the evidence described in this Code section”, and it allows jury instructions on the role of those payments. Subsection (f) preserves each side’s right to challenge reasonableness and necessity, for incurred and projected expenses alike.

Section 51-12-1.1 does not address subrogation or reimbursement rights of health plans, Medicare, or Medicaid. Those remain separate, as discussed below.

What the plaintiff still has to prove

The care must be connected to the crash and be medically necessary, and the amount must be reasonable. Records and bills can start that showing, and a treating physician or other qualified witness can connect them where the link or the need is disputed.

Expenses can include:

• ambulance and emergency care;
• hospital, surgical, and physician charges;
• imaging, medication, and equipment;
• physical, occupational, and speech therapy; and
• counseling for a psychological injury caused by the crash.

Future expenses need evidence of the need and the cost, and present value rules can apply under § 51-12-13. Future medical expenses and life care plans cover that for serious injuries.

Who may have a claim on the money

The amount awarded is not always the amount kept.

• Health plans may assert reimbursement under their terms.
• Medicare and Medicaid have their own recovery rules.
• Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470, a hospital, nursing home, or physician practice may have a lien on the cause of action if it follows the statute’s steps. Under § 44-14-473(a), a release is not effective against a perfected lien unless the lienholder joins in it.
• Workers’ compensation has its own limit in § 34-9-11.1.

Medical liens and subrogation sets these out. MedPay is a separate first-party coverage.

Decisions that follow from the date

1. Fix the date the cause of action arose.
2. If it is on or after April 21, 2025, find out what health coverage the plaintiff had, including coverage not used.
3. Gather both the billed amounts and the amounts the plan would pay.
4. If any care is under a letter of protection, assume the arrangement and any referral will be examined.
5. Value the claim using the numbers a jury may actually hear, and account for any lien before treating a figure as net.

Sources

• Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 34-9-11.1, 44-14-470, 44-14-473, 51-12-13
• Senate Bill 68, as passed (2025): Sections 7, 9(b), enacting § 51-12-1.1
• Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga. App. 824
• Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41

This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.