Georgia Third-Party Claims Under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1: Overview
Published 11 authorities named
Section 34-9-11.1(a) lets an injured Georgia worker or the person to whom the claim survives sue “some person other than the employer” when the injury occurred “under circumstances creating a legal liability” against that person, “except as precluded by Code Section 34-9-11 or otherwise”. So the statute keeps a tort claim alive, but it doesn’t create one. The plaintiff still proves negligence or a defect, and the exclusive remedy still decides who counts as a third party.
Who is and isn’t a third party
| Possible defendant | Status | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Outside driver | Third party | No employment link |
| Manufacturer | Third party | Product claim under § 51-1-11 |
| Separate contractor | Third party, unless above the worker in the chain | § 34-9-8 |
| Owner who isn't a principal contractor | Third party | Yoho |
| Attacker from outside | Third party | Not the employer |
| Security company or property owner | Third party, unless also an employer | Negligent security rules |
| Immediate employer | Not a third party | § 34-9-11(a) |
| Coworker in the job | Not a third party | "an employee of the same employer" |
| Principal contractor | Not a third party | §§ 34-9-8, 34-9-11 |
| Provider of benefits under contract | Not a third party | § 34-9-11(a) |
| Design professional | Protected, unless it assumed safety by written contract | § 34-9-11(a) |
The owner’s position comes from Yoho v. Ringier of America, 263 Ga. 338 (1993): “Only an entity who is secondarily liable for workers’ compensation benefits under OCGA § 34-9-8 (a) is consequently entitled to tort immunity.” The statutory employer doctrine and co-employee immunity cover the two main exclusions.
What each claim needs
The statute leaves the underlying law in place.
| Type | Governing law | Starting point |
|---|---|---|
| Vehicle crash | Traffic and negligence rules | Work trips |
| Machine or tool | § 51-1-11, negligence | First sale date |
| Premises | § 51-3-1, depending on status | Knowledge of the hazard |
| Assault or security | §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 for later causes of action | The attacker and the place |
| Medical treatment after injury | Malpractice rules | Separate requirements |
Workplace violence covers the assault row. Medical negligence during comp treatment can be its own question. Malpractice rules, deadlines, and expert requirements differ, and an authorized doctor isn’t necessarily the employer for this purpose. So ask about it separately.
Who controls the claim and when
Subsection (c) sets the timing.
| Time | Who may sue | Conditions |
|---|---|---|
| First year after injury | The employee | The employer's option hasn't arisen |
| After one year | The employee, or the employer or insurer | The other has notice and intervention rights |
| After the period expires | Claim lost, absent an exception | "within the applicable statute of limitations" |
An employer’s filing doesn’t extend the time. Details are at the first-year rule. If the employer or insurer recovers more than the extent of its lien, subsection (c) says the excess “shall be paid over to the employee”.
What the worker gets, and what comes off
A successful claim pays tort damages, including pain and suffering, and the Act’s compensation doesn’t change what the jury is told is the measure of those damages. But three things can reduce the amount that reaches the worker.
The worker’s fault. Section 51-12-33 reduces recovery, and ends it at 50 percent.
Others’ fault. Each defendant owes its own share. An immune employer can be given a percentage. Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297 (2015), supports that. Under Zaldivar, a nonparty’s fault requires a tort that proximately caused the harm.
The lien. The employer or insurer has a lien for benefits actually paid, recoverable only if the worker has been “fully and completely compensated”. The employer has to prove that, as City of Warner Robins v. Baker, 255 Ga. App. 601 (2002), shows. See made whole enforcement.
The employer’s role in the suit
The employer or insurer may intervene to protect the lien, under § 34-9-11.1(b). Dept. of Admin. Services v. Brown, 219 Ga. App. 27 (1995), reversed a denial of intervention. See the right of intervention.
That creates an awkward situation. An employer can be an intervenor on the lien, while also being a nonparty whose fault the defendant blames. So the employer’s interests may not match the worker’s in every respect, and records in its hands may be sought by both sides.
A death at work
The “those to whom such employee’s right of action survives” language brings the family’s claims into the statute. Georgia’s wrongful death statutes decide who brings them, and those rules aren’t the same as those deciding who gets compensation death benefits. See workplace death claims.
First questions in any workplace injury
- What happened, and what caused it, other than the employer’s conduct?
- Who owned or controlled the place, vehicle, or machine?
- What contracts were in place among the companies?
- Is any proposed defendant in the § 34-9-11(a) list, or above the worker in the chain?
- What evidence is outside the employer’s control?
- When does the one-year mark arrive? And the two-year mark?
Sources
- Yoho v. Ringier of America, 263 Ga. 338
- Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297
- City of Warner Robins v. Baker, 255 Ga. App. 601
- Dept. of Admin. Services v. Brown, 219 Ga. App. 27
- Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 34-9-8, 34-9-11, 34-9-11.1, 51-1-11, 51-3-1, 51-12-33
- Senate Bill 68, as passed (2025): Section 6 (§§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57)
This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
Authorities cited
Georgia code
- O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11
- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8
- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11
- O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1
- O.C.G.A. § 51-3-50
- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1
- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
Court decisions
- Yoho v. Ringier of America, 263 Ga. 338
- Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297
- City of Warner Robins v. Baker, 255 Ga. App. 601
- Dept. of Admin. Services v. Brown, 219 Ga. App. 27
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