Georgia Workplace Violence: When Assault Becomes a Third-Party Claim

A workplace assault in Georgia becomes a third-party claim when someone other than the employer or a protected coworker can answer for it: the attacker, a property owner, or a security contractor. The first question is who attacked and why. The second is where it happened and when, because a negligent security claim arising on or after April 21, 2025 runs under a stricter statute, §§ 51-3-50 through 51-3-57, than one arising before that date.

Who can be sued besides the employer

Attacker or party	Compensation?	Tort claim?	Why
Coworker, in a job-related dispute	May be covered	Likely barred	§ 34-9-11(a), if in the course of the job
Coworker, for personal reasons	May not be an "injury"	May be open	§ 34-9-1(4)
Customer, patient, or client	May be covered	Against the attacker	Not the employer
Robber or stranger	May be covered	Against the attacker	Not the employer
A spouse or partner who comes to work	May be outside the Act	Against the attacker	Personal reasons
Employer as landowner	Depends on the Act	Barred if covered	§ 34-9-11(a)
Another owner or occupier of the site	Not relevant	Possible	Negligent security statute or earlier law
Security contractor	Not relevant	Possible	Section 324A, or the statute

Section 34-9-1(4) excludes “injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee”. So a personal attack may yield no compensation, yet leave a tort claim open. In Murphy v. ARA Services, 164 Ga. App. 859 (1982), the injury “did not arise out of her employment”, and the claim was neither covered nor barred by the Act. No intentional tort exception explains what happens when the injury is covered.

Which security law applies

Section 9(b) of Senate Bill 68 applies the new article “only with respect to causes of action arising on or after the effective date”, which was April 21, 2025.

Date of the cause of action	Governing rule	Foreseeability
Before April 21, 2025	§ 51-3-1 and decisions	Totality of the circumstances
On or after April 21, 2025	§§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57	The statute's listed routes

Under the earlier law, Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023), held “that the totality of the circumstances informs whether a third-party criminal act was reasonably foreseeable”, and that the question is “generally reserved to the trier of fact”. It also held that a party rendering security services may owe a duty to visitors under Restatement Section 324A. Sturbridge Partners v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785 (1997), says that prior criminal activity must be substantially similar, which “does not mean identical”. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991), found no evidence of negligence where a robbery victim had only generalized evidence about the area. Later decisions quote it for the idea that a landowner doesn’t become an insurer of safety by taking precautions.

For later claims, the statute is narrower.

Element, for an invitee, under § 51-3-51	What it asks
Foreseeability	A particularized warning, or actual knowledge of substantially similar prior conduct on the premises, on adjoining property or within 500 yards, or by the same person
Foreseeable consequence	The injury has to be a reasonably foreseeable result
Physical condition	The wrongdoer exploited "a specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner or occupier", creating a risk substantially greater than the general risk in the vicinity
Failure of care	Ordinary care not exercised to remedy or mitigate that condition, as a proximate cause

Section 51-3-53(a) makes the article “the sole and exclusive remedy for negligent security against owners or occupiers”, with stated exceptions. Section 51-3-52 sets a stricter test for a licensee, and § 51-3-54 bars liability for a trespasser, for an injury off the premises, and in other listed settings. Section 51-3-55 says an owner needn’t take on the government’s law enforcement responsibilities. So read the whole article against the facts of the attack.

The employer as landowner

A worker hurt on the employer’s own premises can’t bring this claim against the employer if the injury is covered. Two people assaulted in the same parking lot may have different remedies, a customer and an employee. If the employer only rents the space, the landlord or management company may be a different matter. It may be an owner or occupier outside the Act, so read the lease. Find out who operates and maintains the lot, and whose security contract is in place.

Is it a fault case against the attacker?

Yes, but collection is the difficulty. An attacker may have no assets. Insurance may not cover an intentional act. So a third-party claim’s real value may rest with the premises or security defendant.

Fault is divided too. Carmichael asked whether a rational factfinder could determine that an intentional wrongdoer bore no fault, in a case over an earlier crime. For later claims, § 51-3-56 says the factfinder “shall reasonably apportion fault” to the owner or occupier, to any third person whose wrongful conduct was a cause, and to others under § 51-12-33. It also bars telling jurors about the attacker’s sentence or other punishment. A share placed on the attacker may never be collected.

Compensation for the mental harm

Physical injury matters here. In Southwire v. George, 266 Ga. 739 (1996), a claimant could get benefits for mental disability arising out of an accident with a compensable physical injury. Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88 (1998), rejected compensation for psychological trauma with no physical injury. So a worker who only witnessed violence faces a harder compensation claim. A tort claim against a third party follows its own rules, and may allow recovery for the emotional harm that goes with a physical injury.

When a worker dies

The exclusive remedy reaches the family’s claims against the employer. Claims against the attacker, an owner, or a security firm may proceed under §§ 51-4-1 and 51-4-2. The deadline needs special care. In Hicks v. Universal Health Services, the Court of Appeals held that parents suing over their children’s deaths could not use § 9-3-99, because “the parents have not been murdered”. See wrongful death from criminal acts.

Evidence to collect now

• Video, which can be overwritten quickly.
• Police reports and prior calls for service for that address and nearby ones.
• Prior incident reports known to the owner, since actual knowledge can decide a later claim.
• Leases, management agreements, and security contracts.
• Any threats or warnings, including what was reported and to whom.
• The reason for the attack, including messages between the people involved.

Report the injury to the employer, file for compensation, and check the two-year date in § 9-3-33 from the start. Any recovery may face the lien, under the conditions stated there.

Sources

• Murphy v. ARA Services, 164 Ga. App. 859
• Senate Bill 68, as passed (2025): Sections 6, 9
• Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718
• Sturbridge Partners v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785
• Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491
• Southwire v. George, 266 Ga. 739
• Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88
• Hicks v. Universal Health Services
• Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 9-3-33, 9-3-99, 34-9-1, 34-9-11, 34-9-11.1, 51-3-1, 51-4-1, 51-4-2

This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.