Landlord Liability for Tenant Dog Bites in Georgia
Published 7 authorities named
A Georgia landlord who has given up possession is not liable under the dog bite statute, and has only a narrow exposure under the landlord statute. The Supreme Court of Georgia said so in Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480 (2019): O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 “applies only to” a person who owns or keeps the animal. What a plaintiff then has to show depends on whether the landlord kept any control of the place where it happened.
Start with what the landlord still possesses
| Landlord's position | Governing rule | What it asks |
|---|---|---|
| Out of possession of a rented house | § 44-7-14 | Defective construction or failure to repair, with foreseeability |
| Controls common areas of a complex | § 51-3-1 premises duty | Superior knowledge of the hazard |
| Keeps or houses the dog itself | § 51-2-7 | The ordinary owner or keeper test |
The out-of-possession landlord
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 says a landlord “having fully parted with possession” is “not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant”, but remains responsible for “defective construction” and “failure to keep the premises in repair”.
Tyner tested the repair clause directly. The tenants’ dogs got out through a gate with a broken latch and attacked a person. The Court of Appeals had reasoned that the landlord could be liable for not fixing it. The Supreme Court reversed: there was “no evidence that Tyner was aware that the Thorntons’ dogs had any harmful tendencies or propensities”, so injuries from the failed latch were not reasonably foreseeable. The court noted the landlord knew the dogs existed, and that was not enough.
Note the limits of that language. The opinion rests on what this record lacked. It does not say a landlord who knew the dogs had attacked someone would be liable for a broken latch, although that is the obvious next argument.
The same result followed in Lemontree Properties v. Samples (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). A rental company with no evidence of knowledge of the dog’s aggressive tendencies was entitled to summary judgment. The plaintiffs also could not use a city ordinance’s definition of “owner” as a separate negligence per se claim, because the court pointed to § 44-7-14 as the General Assembly’s treatment of landlords.
The landlord of an apartment complex
A complex with shared walkways and lawns raises a different statute. A claim there is framed as premises liability under § 51-3-1, covered on the premises statute page, and the test is comparative knowledge.
GoldOller Management Services v. Smith (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) is the useful example. A resident emailed the complex about two encounters with a dog and its owner. He was later hurt trying to escape from it. The court reversed the denial of summary judgment for the manager because the resident “failed to show that appellants had superior knowledge”. The resident knew at least as much as the manager did, so the complaint itself was the problem for his case: it proved his knowledge along with theirs.
The result for a reader is uncomfortable, and it is the law as stated in that decision. A complaint to management has to do two things at once: show what the manager knew, and be weighed against what the person complaining also knew.
What about the lease?
The Georgia cases on this page don’t hold that a pet clause, by itself, creates liability. A landlord who bans dogs has a reason to say it knew nothing. A landlord who collects a pet fee knows a dog exists, and Tyner shows that existence is not propensity. A lease can matter as evidence of who controlled what, and of what the landlord knew.
A landlord who also keeps the dog
The statutory words are “owns or keeps”. A landlord who lives on the premises and looks after a tenant’s dog is in a different position from one who has parted with possession. Cormier v. Willis, 313 Ga. App. 699 (2012), goes the other way on facts: a homeowner father was neither owner nor keeper of a dog belonging to his daughter while he was out of state. The test turns on actual keeping.
What evidence decides these cases
Evidence in the three decisions above turned on a narrow set of facts:
- what, exactly, the landlord or manager was told, by whom, and when;
- whether the bite happened in the leased premises or an area the landlord controls;
- what the injured person knew; and
- for a repair theory, what defect existed and how it connects to the injury.
A broader theory has to be reconciled with those cases. For the tenant who owns the dog, the ordinary rules apply, as the Georgia dog bite overview explains. A report that the dog had bitten before, delivered to the landlord in writing, is a fact that could change the analysis against a landlord, though it doesn’t guarantee an outcome.
Sources
- Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 44-7-14, 51-2-7, 51-3-1
- Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480
- Lemontree Properties v. Samples (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
- GoldOller Management Services v. Smith (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)
- Cormier v. Willis, 313 Ga. App. 699
This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
More on: Dog bite
Authorities cited
Georgia code
- O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7
- O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14
- O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1
Court decisions
- Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480
- Lemontree Properties v. Samples (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
- GoldOller Management Services v. Smith (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)
- Cormier v. Willis, 313 Ga. App. 699
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