Co-Employee Immunity in Georgia Workers’ Comp
Published 11 authorities named
Georgia’s § 34-9-11(a) keeps an injured worker from suing a third party who is “an employee of the same employer”, so a coworker whose negligence caused a covered injury is protected from suit, within limits. Two limits matter. The coworker must have been acting in the course of employment, and the injury must be one the Act covers. In Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 (2012), the Supreme Court approved the rule, yet reversed because that first point had not been shown beyond dispute.
What the decisions establish
| Decision | Facts | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Ridley v. Monroe, 256 Ga. App. 686 (2002) | A worker hurt in a coworker's car settled a compensation claim, then sued the coworker | Suit barred |
| Smith v. Ellis (2012) | Worker with a Board-approved settlement sued a coworker | Ridley approved, but the coworker's course of employment was not undisputed, so judgment reversed |
| Hennly v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 355 (1994) | Battery claim over a coworker's pipe smoke | Barred, as the smoke was part of the work environment |
Ridley is a warning. The dissent in that case saw evidence that the worker wasn’t injured in the scope of her job. The majority held that she alleged injury in the course of employment, sought compensation, and settled for a lump sum, so § 34-9-11 barred her claim. So a worker’s own compensation claim can affect a later suit against a coworker. Think about both before filing or settling.
Scope is the argument
The statute speaks of “an employee of the same employer”. Decisions then look at whether that person was acting in the course of the job. Smith shows that this has to be established. It is also a defense the defendant has to prove. See Crook v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, A26A0470 (2026), which disapproved treating the exclusivity bar as jurisdictional.
| Facts about the coworker | Likely direction | Questions |
|---|---|---|
| Driving a company truck on a delivery | Immunity likely | Was it the assigned trip? |
| Driving own car to lunch with a coworker | Open | Lunch and commute rules |
| Careless use of a machine at work | Immunity likely | Was the coworker doing the job? |
| Fight over a job dispute | Depends | Reason for the attack |
| Assault over a personal grudge | May fall outside | § 34-9-1(4) |
| Selling the worker a defective car | Outside the job | Not an employment act |
Those lines aren’t fixed rules. Each depends on facts, including what the employer knew and permitted.
Mannion v. Mendez, A20A0452 (2020), is about an employer’s vicarious liability, not immunity, so it serves only as an example of how a lunch trip can be analyzed. The compensation standard differs in its details, and Frett v. State Farm, 309 Ga. 44 (2020), covers lunch breaks on that side.
Intentional acts by a coworker
No general exception lets a worker sue because a coworker’s act was intentional, if the injury is covered by the Act. But an assault for reasons personal to the worker isn’t an “injury” under § 34-9-1(4). So the personal-reason question can open a suit against the attacker. The reasoning is at no intentional tort exception. A coworker’s criminal liability is separate in any event, and a worker can report a crime.
What it doesn’t protect
| Party | Why not protected by this rule |
|---|---|
| Another company's worker on the same site | Not "an employee of the same employer" |
| The maker of a machine a coworker misused | A product claim stands on its own |
| An at-fault outside driver | Not protected at all |
| A supervisor for a separate company | Check who employed that person |
For temporary or leased workers, § 34-9-11(c) extends immunity to the business using them when benefits are provided, and it treats the temporary or leasing company as a statutory employer. So find out who pays and who supervises before deciding who “the same employer” is. Multi-employer sites raise this directly.
Effect on the rest of the case
A coworker who can’t be sued can still matter. Under § 51-12-33(c), a jury considers everyone who contributed, whether or not they could be named. Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297 (2015), reached that result for an immune employer. A defendant such as a manufacturer can argue that a coworker was at fault, and a percentage on that coworker reduces the defendant’s share.
So investigate coworker conduct even if no claim will be brought. If a third party’s share may be cut by it, the case should deal with that evidence head on.
A co-worker’s injury in a vehicle may also lead to a UM question, or an outside driver. See motor vehicle accidents at work.
Before suing or settling
- Who was the coworker’s employer that day?
- What was the coworker doing, and for whom?
- Has the worker claimed compensation, and on what statement of facts?
- Is there a third party whose share might be cut by the coworker’s conduct?
- Which deadlines apply, including two years under § 9-3-33?
Sources
- Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566
- Ridley v. Monroe, 256 Ga. App. 686
- Hennly v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 355
- Crook v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, A26A0470
- Mannion & Mannion v. Mendez, A20A0452
- Frett v. State Farm, 309 Ga. 44
- Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297
- Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 9-3-33, 34-9-1, 34-9-11, 51-12-33
This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
More on: Hurt at work
- Georgia Motor Vehicle Accidents at Work: Workers’ Comp + Third-Party
- Workers’ Comp and Personal Injury in Georgia: System Interaction
- Georgia Construction Site Injuries: Workers’ Comp and Subcontractors
- Georgia Made Whole Doctrine and Workers’ Comp Lien Enforcement
- Georgia Defective Equipment Workers’ Comp + Product Liability
- No Intentional Tort Exception in Georgia Workers’ Comp
Authorities cited
Georgia code
- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11
- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1
- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
Court decisions
- Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566
- Ridley v. Monroe, 256 Ga. App. 686
- Hennly v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 355
- Crook v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, A26A0470
- Mannion & Mannion v. Mendez, A20A0452
- Frett v. State Farm, 309 Ga. 44
- Walker v. Tensor Machinery, 298 Ga. 297
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