Manufacturer vs. Product Seller Under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11.1

Under § 51-1-11.1(b), a “product seller is not a manufacturer” and isn’t liable as one in strict liability. So a Georgia store, distributor, importer, or labeler can’t be sued under § 51-1-11 for a defect it merely passed along. It can still answer for its own negligence, as a dealer who gave poor safety advice might. The difference can decide who has to pay if the real manufacturer is overseas or gone.

What the statute covers

Subsection (a) defines a product seller as a person who “leases or sells and distributes; installs; prepares; blends; packages; labels; markets; or assembles pursuant to a manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, specifications, or formulation; or repairs; maintains; or otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of commerce”. A manufacturer doesn’t lose that status by also doing some of these. It applies to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1987.

Subsection (c) adds two limits: the section doesn’t create a cause of action, and it doesn’t affect “the right of any person to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution”.

Who has been held on which side

Defendant	What it did	Result	Decision
Middleman for a tool cutter	Bought and resold	Seller	Ream Tool v. Newton
Ladder brand	Name stamped by a Taiwan maker	Seller	Alltrade v. McDonald
Toy and bicycle retailer	Own "Rallye" brand on bikes	Seller	Buford v. Toys R' Us
Tool importer	Described size and hardness to trading companies, spot-tested	Seller	Schneider v. Tri Star
Wholesaler of hitch pins	Bought and resold after buying the assets of a business	Seller	Farmex v. Wainwright
Pharmacist and pharmacy	Packaged and labeled	Seller	Robinson v. Williamson
Equipment dealer	Sold another's forklift	Seller on strict liability	Boyce v. Gregory Poole
Company that assembled forklifts	Called itself a manufacturer in earlier papers	Not shown to be a mere seller	Dean v. Toyota Industrial

The “ostensible manufacturer” is gone. In Alltrade v. McDonald, 213 Ga. App. 758 (1994), a person hurt by a collapsing step relied on the old rule that one who puts out another’s product as its own is liable like the maker. The court held that “one who merely labels a product as its own prior to its sale but has no input into its making, either by design or manufacture or assembly, is a product seller”. Cases to the contrary “will no longer be followed”.

Schneider v. Tri Star International, 223 Ga. App. 85 (1996), shows how much involvement falls short. An importer told trading companies what size, appearance, and hardness it wanted, and it ran spot checks. That was still a seller. The court noted that current business practices “may have unduly limited the application” of the statute, and called that a matter for the legislature.

Where the line can be crossed

The cases point to real input in design, manufacture, or assembly. Dean v. Toyota Industrial Equipment, 246 Ga. App. 255 (2000), held that “[a] defendant can be both a manufacturer and a seller simultaneously”, and a company that assembled forklifts didn’t show it was a mere seller.

Other points to test:

• Specifications. Did the company write the design or formula? In Thomasson v. Rich Products, 232 Ga. App. 424 (1998), a staple in a bagel case under the food statute, § 51-1-23, there was no evidence the recipe was based on the distributor’s specifications.
• Same owners. A successor can be liable if it’s a “mere continuation” of the maker, which Farmex v. Wainwright, 269 Ga. 548 (1998), ties to “some identity of ownership”.
• Assembly. The statute treats assembling “pursuant to a manufacturer’s plan” as selling. Doing more than following the plan may change this.
• Rebuilding. A company that substantially changes a product invites the argument that it made a new one.
• Advisory board seats. In Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equipment, 269 Ga. App. 891 (2004), an employee’s seat on a maker’s advisory board didn’t turn a dealer into a manufacturer.

A seller’s own negligence

A seller is outside strict liability only. In Boyce, a dealer that didn’t mention an optional rear guard, and that inspected the site and gave advice, faced a jury question on negligence and misrepresentation. A forklift operator had been killed.

But there are limits on what a seller must do. Buford v. Toys R’ Us, 217 Ga. App. 565 (1995), says that a seller of “an article in common and general use”, selling “in the usual course of trade and without knowledge of any dangerous quality”, isn’t negligent for failing to find a latent defect. A weld inside a bike’s frame fell within that. Ream Tool v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226 (1993), is in accord.

Theory against a seller	Requires	Weak point
Negligent failure to warn	It knew of the danger and didn't tell	Knowledge
Negligent advice or installation	Its own act was careless	The act itself
Misrepresentation	A false statement that was relied on	Reliance and causation
Implied warranty	Privity and timely notice	§ 11-2-318; § 11-2-607(3)(a)
Fraud or business practices	Intent to deceive	Stubbs v. Home Depot

A warranty isn’t the same as strict liability. In Stubbs v. Home Depot, A26A0824 (2026), the retailer’s “no oil change needed” materials didn’t lead to liability. The court said that the implied warranty protects against a defect at sale and doesn’t warrant “continuing serviceability”, and two years of problem-free use undercut the claim. Buford also lost its warranty count for failing to give notice in time.

Choosing defendants

1. Identify the real maker. Look at markings, serial numbers, and purchase orders, not just the brand.
2. Find a reachable manufacturer. Foreign makers raise service and jurisdiction problems. Ask how they can be reached.
3. Check for a U.S. affiliate’s role. Design input or assembly can change the analysis.
4. Name a seller only on a real theory. Be ready to show what it did or knew.
5. Keep the deadline in view. § 9-3-33 sets two years. A seller’s motion may arrive after the time to add the maker has run.

Between seller and maker, a purchase order may require indemnity, as one did in Buford, and § 51-1-11.1(c) leaves such rights in place. That’s a dispute between them. It doesn’t give the injured person a strict liability claim.

A trial use can count as a sale for the maker. In Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744 (1987), a maker placed a fryer in a restaurant on trial, and § 51-1-11 applied. The strict liability theory itself is on strict liability versus negligence.

Sources

• Alltrade v. McDonald, 213 Ga. App. 758
• Schneider v. Tri Star International, 223 Ga. App. 85
• Dean v. Toyota Industrial Equipment, 246 Ga. App. 255
• Thomasson v. Rich Products, 232 Ga. App. 424
• Farmex v. Wainwright, 269 Ga. 548
• Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equipment, 269 Ga. App. 891
• Buford v. Toys R’ Us, 217 Ga. App. 565
• Ream Tool v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226
• Robinson v. Williamson, 245 Ga. App. 17
• Stubbs v. Home Depot, A26A0824
• Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744
• Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 9-3-33, 11-2-318, 11-2-607, 51-1-11, 51-1-11.1, 51-1-23

This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.