Duty to invitees in Georgia premises liability cases

A Georgia owner or occupier owes an invitee ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe, under § 51-3-1, and that includes looking for dangers it doesn’t already know about. It isn’t a guarantee. Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735 (1997), says the owner must “exercise the diligence toward making the premises safe that a good business person is accustomed to use in such matters”. It’s the highest of the three premises duties, and it has real limits.

What the duty includes

Robinson adds that this “includes inspecting the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which the owner/occupier does not have actual knowledge, and taking reasonable precautions to protect invitees from dangers foreseeable from the arrangement or use of the premises”.

Part	What it asks	Decision
Inspect	Look for hazards the owner hasn't been told about	Robinson; Dumas
Respond	Remove, repair, or guard against what is found	Todd
Warn	Give a warning that actually works where people are	American Multi-Cinema v. Brown
Plan for foreseeable use	Account for how the place is arranged and used	Robinson
Cover the approach	Act within the owner's rights there	Todd

An invitee “is entitled to assume that the owner/occupier has exercised reasonable care to make the premises safe”, and to assume it continues while the invitee remains, as Robinson puts it. That’s why not looking at every footfall isn’t negligence as a matter of law. The statute has the full text.

Inspection. Dumas v. Tripps of North Carolina, 229 Ga. App. 814 (1997), shows what happens when an owner is silent on it. Tripps presented no evidence about its inspections of the lot or how long the ice had been there, and the court sent the case back. Reasonableness varies with the facts. There’s no statutory interval, as inspection routines explains.

Warnings. A warning isn’t magic. In American Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442 (2009), the Supreme Court rejected a special immunity for warning devices. The sign there was knocked over by a crowd and became what the customer tripped on.

What the duty doesn’t include

No duty to	Language	Source
Insure against every injury	"[N]ot required to warrant the safety of all persons from all things"	Robinson
Patrol constantly	"[N]o duty to continuously patrol the premises in absence of facts showing that the premises are unusually dangerous"	Alterman
Mop rain as it comes in	No duty "to keep a large force of moppers"	Walker
Light every passage	No obligation "to illuminate passageways, porches or steps, absent a contractual or statutory duty to do so"	Suddarth
Clear natural ice	No "affirmative duty" to remove a natural accumulation	Speaks, with limits

Weather hazards explains the limits on the ice rule. The word “unusually” in Alterman is an opening. Facts that make a place unusually dangerous can raise what ordinary care demands. And these limits are general statements, so a specific claim may fall on either side.

The duty runs through knowledge

The legal test for a fall comes from Robinson: the owner’s “actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard”, and the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge “despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier”. The duty and the knowledge test work as a pair. An owner with no reason to know of a hazard hasn’t breached the duty just because it existed.

Scenario	Likely focus	Example
Owner created it	Knowledge follows more directly	Worker's sign in Brown
Spill by a stranger	Time on floor, employee nearby	Drossman
Fixed feature	Visibility and prior passage	Brixmor; Stevens
Item stored in the aisle	Whether it was expected there	Miller v. Dolgencorp
General risk known to the owner	Not the same as the specific hazard	Drossman, on leaks

In Miller v. Dolgencorp, A25A1363 (2025), a customer knew the aisles were crowded with boxes and crates and caught her pants on an open crate. She lost, because the owner lacked superior knowledge. Actual versus constructive notice separates the two knowledge routes.

Who qualifies and where

Business customers are the obvious case, but not the only one. Georgia’s test asks whether the owner “will receive some benefit, real or supposed, or has some interest in the purpose of the visit”, and no sale is required, under Cham v. ECI Management, 311 Ga. 170 (2021). In Suddarth, a mail carrier’s claim was analyzed under the invitee standard, though the owners won. Stepping outside the invited area can change the status, as classification shows.

The duty doesn’t apply to the same degree everywhere on the land.

• Approaches. “[C]ircumscribed by his right in the approach”, under Todd v. F. W. Woolworth, 258 Ga. 194 (1988).
• Leased premises. Different statute, § 44-7-14, if the owner has fully parted with possession.
• Crime by a third person. For causes of action arising on or after SB 68’s effective date in 2025, §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 are the exclusive negligent security route, with exceptions, and § 51-3-55 says no owner must exercise “extraordinary care”.

The invitee’s side

A plaintiff who knew of the specific hazard has a problem. “[I]t is a plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific hazard which precipitates [the injury] which is determinative”, said Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51 (2017). But SMG Construction Services v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819 (2025), adds that misunderstanding the “precise details” of a known hazard doesn’t negate knowledge.

Fault is divided under § 51-12-33, and a plaintiff at 50 percent or more recovers nothing. The time limit in § 9-3-33 is two years. A government owner adds notice deadlines.

How to frame a claim

1. Why was the person there, and who benefited?
2. Which of the owner’s obligations does this hazard touch?
3. What evidence goes to the owner’s knowledge?
4. Which of the no-duty lines will the owner cite?
5. What did the person know, and what’s the reason for not seeing it?

Sources

• Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735
• Dumas v. Tripps of North Carolina, 229 Ga. App. 814
• American Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442
• Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620
• Walker v. Sears Roebuck, 278 Ga. App. 677
• Suddarth v. Lounsbrough, 369 Ga. App. 158
• Speaks v. Rouse Co. of Georgia, 172 Ga. App. 9
• Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, A24A1720
• Brixmor New Chastain Corners v. James, 367 Ga. App. 235
• Stevens v. Welch, A25A0778
• Miller v. Dolgencorp, A25A1363
• Cham v. ECI Management, 311 Ga. 170
• Todd v. F. W. Woolworth, 258 Ga. 194
• Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51
• SMG Construction Services v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819
• Official Code of Georgia Annotated, November 2022 public release: §§ 9-3-33, 44-7-14, 51-3-1, 51-12-33
• Georgia Senate Bill 68 (2025): §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57

This page was last reviewed in November 2026 for general information. Laws and court decisions can change after that date. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.